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COAL POLICY - NEED IT BE THE
WEST AGAINST THE REST?
C. Peter Goplerud III*
Duffy Ruimerman**
Oil, natural gas, and coal constitute the three primary sources
for industrial and personal energy use in this country. In recent
years, however, supplies of oil and natural gas have been dwin-
dling.1 The 1973 Arab oil embargo focused the attention of the
American public for the first time on the important role and det-
rimental effects of heavy foreign oil consumption. More recently,
developments in Iran brought renewed emphasis on attempts to
shift energy usage away from imported oil. As part of this em-
phasis, President Carter urged that increased attention be paid
to the nation's most abundant energy resource: coal.
The United States possesses thirty-one percent of the world's
economically recoverable coal reserves,2 and coal comprises
roughly ninety percent of total United States fossil-fuel
reserves. 3 Despite these enormous reserves, coal lags behind as a
source of energy. In 1977, coal supplied only eighteen percent of
total American energy needs, compared to a seventy-five percent
share for oil and natural gas.4 Thus, beginning in 1977 with the
announcement of the National Energy Plan,5 development and
use of the nation's vast coal resources became a focal point of
controversy, government policymaking, and industrial planning.
Since the Plan's inception, however, no drastic change has oc-
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1. See ENERGY POLICY AND PLANNING, ExEcIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN 11-19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN].
2. Pelham, Bright Future Seen for Coal, But Many Problems Remain, 38 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1481 (1980).
3. NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, supra note 1, at xii.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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curred to remedy the disproportionate emphasis on oil and natu-
ral gas, over coal, as energy sources. Although coal use has in-
creased by about five percent annually, and production is 
projected to reach one billion tons by 1985,6 the industry oper-
ates presently at a level far below its actual capacity: twelve per-
cent of the estimated 1980 coal production of approximately 825 
million tons7 never was produced.8 The 20,000 miners who are 
presently unemployed8 further demonstrate the lack of a strong 
market for coal. 
This picture seems inconsistent with the announced policy 
aim to promote coal production and consumption. In tracing the 
roots of this inconsistency, no simple or clear answer exists, for a 
multitude of factors come into play. The lack of a definitive na-
tional energy policy,10 though, certainly constitutes an important 
deficiency, despite the comprehensive scope of the original Na-
tional Energy Plan.11 A more important factor, however, may be 
6. Pelham, supra note 2, at 1483. This contrasts with the National Energy Plan, 
which sought to increase production to about 1.2 billion tons annually by 1985. See NA-
TIONAL ENERGY PLAN, supra note 1, at 63-64, 94-96. 
7. See Franklin, Coal's Future, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, § 1, at 1, col 1. 
8. The industry has 100 million tons of excess capacity. Pelham, supra note 2, at 
1481. 
9. Id. 
10. See generally Entin, Energy Politics in the House of Representatives: The Na-
tional Energy Plan, 11 CONN. L. REV. 403 (1979). 
11. A number of pieces of federal legislation - several focusing on coal use and de-
velopment - could form the basis for such a national energy policy. The Energy Supply 
and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-792 (1976 & Supp. m 
1979) ("ESECA"), was the first pro-coal legislation to emerge in the 1970's. ESECA pro-
vided authority for ordering utilities using oil or natural gas to convert to coal and gener-
ally required new plants to be designed to utilize coal. The impact of ESECA was negli-
gible, however, leading Congress to enact in 1978 the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8483 (Supp. ill 1979) ("FUA"). FUA, one of five parts of the 
National Energy Act of 1978, serves essentially as a replacement for ESECA. It encour-
ages substitution of coal for oil and natural gas in electric generating plants and indus-
trial boilers, see id. § 8341, and it also prohibits new facilities from using oil or natural 
gas as a primary source, id. § 8311. 
Most recently, Congress enacted the Energy Security Act of 1980, P.L. 96-294, 94 Stat. 
611 (to be codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8912), establishing the United States 
Synthetic Fuels Corporation. The Corporation is authorized to provide up to $20 billion 
in subsidies to industrial concerns wishing to construct facilities to produce synthetic 
fuel from, among other resources, coal. Finally, in 1980 yet another effort was under-
taken to encourage conversion to coal by utilities, particularly in the Northeast. The so-
called "Oil Back-out" bill, S. 2470, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S8092 (1980), 
which would have provided loans and grants to enable some 80 power plants to convert 
from oil and natural gas to coal as a fuel source, passed the Senate but never found its 
way to the floor of the House. 
Given the apparent congressional interest, there must be stumbling blocks which have 
blocked major increases in coal production. Arguments can be made that the various 
pieces of environmental legislation and their accompanying regulations stifle increased 
coal development. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. ill 1979), for exam-
FALL 1981] Coal Development Policy 79 
the conflict between regionalism and nationalism - a contempo-
rary version of the time-honored battle between states' rights 
and a .strong central government.12 Specifically, the interests of 
the Western States18 - actors critical to the development of the 
country's coal reserves - are not necessarily harmonious with 
the national policy to promote coal production and 
consumption. 
The Western States possess roughly fifty-four percent of the 
nation's economically recoverable coal reserves,14 with a full 
ple, imposes strict limitations upon emissions of sulphur dioxide, particulates, and nitro-
gen oxides, all of which result from burning coal. Moreover, coal-fired power plants and 
coal mines present serious water pollution problems which are stringently regulated 
under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Finally, 
coal-burning plants produce some hazardous wastes, especially at plants employing flue 
gas desulphurization equipment (scrubbers), disposal of which is regulated by the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. ill 1979). 
Remedying these various pollution problems arising from coal use has· proved to be 
costly, time consuming, and, in some cases, politically difficult. 
Further concerns arise that transportation issues will frustrate gains in coal produc-
tion. Over the last several years there has been a critical shortage of railroad hopper cars 
used for transporting coal. Additionally, there have been bureaucratic delays in approv-
ing new rail lines important to coal production, such as the long-delayed Star Lake Rail-
road which, if ever approved, would form a link with substantial coal deposits in the Star 
Lake Bisti area of northwest New Mexico. Coal Leases on BLM Lands in New Mexico: 
Hearing Before the Subcqmm. on Energy Resources and Materials Production of the 
Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1979) (state-
ment of Arthur W. Zimmerman). The alternative mode of traµsporting coal - the slurry 
pipeline, a system whereby coal is pulverized and pumped through a pipeline to a distri-
bution center - appears mired in political and legal difficulties. Railroads strenuously 
resist this encroachment upon their near-monopoly over coal transportation, and many 
localities oppose granting rights of y,ay to such a pipeline. 
Finally, coal development may be slowed by resistance to the economic and social im-
pacts arising from intensive production activities. Many fear the boomtown syndrome, 
where a sudden influx of people associated with mining or other coal-related activities 
can have a devastating effect on the fiber of a region. See, e.g., Goplerud & O'Neil, Coal 
Gasification: The Critical Issues, 58 DEN. L.J. 35, 44-46 {1980); Little, Some Social Con-
sequences of Boom Towns, 53 N.D. L. REv. 401 (1977). 
12. See Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 
1980 UTAH L. REV. 505; Rocky Mountain High, TIME, Dec. 15, 1980, at 28; The Angry 
West Vs. the Rest, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 1979, at 31. 
13. For purposes of this Article, "Western States" refers to Montana, Wyoming, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, Idaho, and Arizona. 
Energy concerns in the West are significant enough that two different organizations have 
been formed by the state governments in the region to foster Western programs and 
policies. One is the Western Governor's Policy Office. Members of this organization in-
clude North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Ari-
zona, Utah, Nevada, and Alaska. The other organization, the Western Interstate Energy 
Board, is composed of the same states plus Idaho, Washington, Oregon, California, and 
Hawaii. 
14. FEDERAL CoAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. 
DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT 2-1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
COAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT]; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LmRARY OF CON-
GRESS, THE ENERGY FACTBOOK 582-83 (Comm. Print 96-IFC-60, 1980) [hereinafter cited 
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forty percent of the nation's reserves located in Wyoming and 
Montana alone.15 Much of this coal, however, lies beneath public 
lands or has been retained by· the federal government during va-
rious historical land grants, so that the federal government con-
trols approximately eighty percent of the coal reserves18 and 
owns nearly half the land17 in the Western States. Government 
land ownership ranges from thirty percent in Montana to eighty-
seven percent in Nevada.18 This ownership of land and resources 
gives the federal government almost complete control over coal 
production west of the Mississippi. Thus arises the conflict be-
tween the Western States and the federal government, perceived 
frequently as an absentee landlord. Many in the West do not 
want Washington to dictate how and when to develop the re-
gion's natural resources; these people bristle under domination 
by federal policies.19 
Some federal officials and business leaders, however, argue 
that decisions regarding whether to open an area for coal devel-
opment should rest with the owners of the land.20 As noted, this 
approach would leave most development decisions in the West 
with the federal government. Westerners counter, though, that 
this orientation overlooks, or oversimplifies, the impact of such 
development upon nearby land and communities.21 These people 
face concerns far more immediate than the importance of coal to 
as ENERGY FACTBOOK]. See also Horwitch, Coal: Constrained Abundance, in ENERGY Fu-
TURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 79, 87 (1979}. 
"Reserves" denotes coal that can be mined at prevailing market prices. 
15. ENERGY FACTBOOK, supra note 14, at 582. See also Coal Severance Taxes: Hear-
ings on H.R. 6625, 6654, and 7163 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the 
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980) 
(statement of Samuel L. Devine) [hereinafter cited as Severance Tax Hearings]. 
16. CoAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 2-1. 
17. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 
1979, at 9. 
18. Id. See generally AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, Two ENERGY FuTURES: A NA-
TIONAL CHOICE FOR THE 80s 62-68 (1980}; P. GATES & R. SWENSON, HISTORY OF PUBLIC 
LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT (1968); PUBLIC LAND LAW REV. CoMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NA-
TION'S LAND (1970); Watson, The Federal Coal Follies-A New Program Ends (Begins) 
A Decade of Anxiety??, 58 DEN. L.J. 65 (1980). 
19. See A Second American Revolution, Address by Sen. Orrin Hatch to Western 
Coalition on Public Lands, Reno, Nevada (Sept. 6, 1979) [on .file with the Journal of Law 
Reform]; Melloan, Rebellious Mood in the West, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1979, at 16, col. 3; 
NEWSWEEK, supra note 12, at 32. 
20. See White & Barry, Energy Development in the West: Conflict and Coordination 
of Governmental Decision-Making, 52 N.D. L. REv. 451, 500 (1976). 
21. Rock Springs and Green River, Wyoming, are two examples of communities 
which have suffered adversely from the impacts of energy development. See Daley, Fi-
nancing Housing and Public Facilities in Energy Boom Towns, in 22 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. 
INST. PROCEEDINGS 47, 49-50 (1976). See generally Gilmore, Boom Towns May Hinder 
Energy Development, 191 SCIENCE 535 (1976). 
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the nation's energy future. · 
This Article will analyze the legal issues involved in this 
"West against the rest" conflict. While numerous areas of disa-
greement exist within the larger picture of Western-federal rela-
tions, the Article will focus on two specific issues of present con-
cern. First, the Article will explore the role of the states under 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. 22 This 
section includes an analysis of recent litigation involving regula-
tions promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior relating to 
the establishment of state mining programs. Second, the Article 
will address the imposition of state severance taxes on coal, with 
particular emphasis on the Montana tax sustained recently by 
the Supreme Court. The Article's essential premise is that sound 
policy should balance the substantial federal interest in develop-
ment of Western energy sources against state and local concerns 
regarding the social, economic, and environmental impacts of 
this development. 28 
I. SURFACE MINING 
Surface mining presently produces approximately sixty-one 
percent of the coal mined in this country.24 Beyond doubt, this 
mining method, while· an expedient means of production, seri-
ously disrupts the land. This disruption in the past has been felt 
particularly in several Eastern states,25 and by the mid-1970's it 
became apparent that various Western states soon would be af-
fected. Programs enacted at the state level to combat the ad-
verse effects of strip mining were largely unsuccessful.26 Thus, 
Congress aimed for a federal regulatory scheme which would sat-
isfy the need for a rational approach both to strip mining and to 
efforts at reclaiming the land after strip-mining efforts had been 
completed. 
Toward this end, in 1977 Congress enacted the Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act21 ("SMCRA"). The SMCRA 
contains several very important and explicit findings and pur-
22. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979). 
23. See Harvey, Federal-State Relationships in Federal Land and Resource Man· 
agement, 54 DEN. L.J. 585, 588-89 (1977). 
24. ENERGY FACTB0OK, supra note 14, at 548. 
25. See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58, reprinted in (1977) U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & AD. NEWS 593, 596 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 218). 
26. H.R. REP. No. 218, supra note 25, at 73. 
27. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979). 
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poses. Congress made clear its understanding of the potential 
devastation caused by surface mining,28 while emphasizing the 
importance of coal production to the nation's energy future.29 
Through the SMCRA, Congress aimed to create a national pro-
gram for controlling the methods and effects of surface mining, 
in a manner calculated to protect the environment and to pro-
vide the coal deemed necessary for energy stability.30 Most im-
portantly, for purposes of this Article, Congress found that due 
to "the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical, or other 
physical conditions in areas subject to mining operations, the 
primary governmental responsibility for developing, authoriz-
ing, issuing, and enforcing regulations for surface mining and 
reclamation operations subject to [the SMCRAJ should rest 
with the States."31 This concept of state control or "primacy" 
was emphasized several times during consideration of the SM-
CRA.32 The concept had been found workable for air and water 
pollution control and was perceived as essential to successful 
management of surface mining. 33 
A. Constitutional Challenges to the SMCRA 
Within a short time after enactment, the SMCRA began to 
come under close scrutiny from the states and various mining 
concerns. Litigants in Virginia,8• Indiana, u Iowa, 38 and Tennes-
28. Id. § 120l(c). 
29. Id. § 120l(d). 
30. Id. § 1202. 
31. Id. § 120l(f)(emphasis added). 
32. See H.R. REP. No. 218, supra note 25, at 57, 129. 
33. The key to the Act is Title V, designed to lay the groundwork for control of the 
environmental impacts of surface mining. Parties intending to conduct surface mining 
operations must obtain a permit either from the state where the operations will occur, or 
from the Federal Office of Surface Mining Enforcement and Reclamation, depending 
upon which authority has responsibility for the program. 30 U.S.C. § 1256 (Supp. III 
1979). The SMCRA sets forth specific design criteria and performance standards which 
must be incorporated into the permit. Id. §§ 1257, 1265. The permit cannot be issued 
without preparation by the operator of a reclamation plan. Id. § 1258. Furthermore, the 
operator must file a performance bond prior to issuance of the permit, id. § 1259, guaran-
teeing adherence to the requirements of the permit. The SMCRA also describes proce-
dures and criteria for designation of particular areas as unsuitable for surface mining. Id. 
§ 1272. Finally, the Act requires operators to pay a fee of 35 cents per ton of coal pro-
duced to fund reclamation activities at abandoned mine sites. Id. § 1232. 
34. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981). 
35. Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981). See also Andrus v. P-Burg Coal Co., 495 
F. Supp. 82 (S.D. Ind. 1980), af/'d, 644 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1981). 
36. Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 14 ENVIR. REP. 1325 (S.D. Iowa 1980), vacated sub nom. 
Watt v: Star Coal Co., 101 S. Ct. 3132 (1981). 
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see37 have challenged the legislation on the basis of the com-
merce clause and the fifth and tenth amendments. The most re-
cent constitutional attacks on the SMCRA, Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Association38 and Hodel v. Indi-
ana, 39 form the basis of analysis here. Although the cases were 
not consolidated, Justice Marshall, author of both majority opin-
ions, apparently focused upon Virginia40 as the "lead" decision; 
this Article will do likewise. 
The cases advanced two constitutional objections to the 
SMCRA. The first and least appealing contention was that the 
commerce clause41 did not authorize the legislation. Although 
. one lower court"2 had agreed with the contention that the 
SMCRA's restraints on land use regulated purely local activity 
having no impact on interstate commerce, the Supreme Court 
disagreed, finding the legislation to have a firm commerce clause 
basis. Congress had made explicit findings, expressed in the text 
of the Act, that surface mining influences interstate commerce 
- and the Court continued a long trend of deference to congres-
sional findings regarding the impact of activities upon interstate 
commerce."8 Beyond doubt, coal mining has some effect upon in-
terstate commerce, even though mining operations themselves 
are purely local activities."" Given this effect, the concerns re-
flected in the SMCRA - for the long-term productivity of mine 
lands and for avoiding health and safety hazards in mining -
fall within the scope of Congress' power to adopt reasonable 
means for regulating interstate commerce.415 The decisions are 
consistent with previous cases and do not expand the already 
broad powers of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.48 
37. Concerned Citizens of Appalachia, Inc. v. Andrus, 494 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Tenn. 
1980), rev'd mem., No. 80-1448 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 1982). 
38. 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981). 
39. 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981). 
40. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981). 
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
42. Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Hodel v. 
Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981). · 
43. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. at 2359-64. 
44. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
45. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. at 2362-64. 
46. Justice Rehnquist, concurring in Virginia, expressed his fear that the majority 
had broadened the expansive scope of congressional power under the commerce clause. 
He criticized the majority approach for its failure to emphasize that Congress may regu-
late only those activities having a "substantial effect" upon interstate commerce; the 
majority's various renditions of the commerce clause test had included the "substantial" 
phraseology only once. 
This concern, however, appears to be a false alarm. The Court has not unfailingly 
included the term "substantial" when describing the test to be utilized in assessing con-
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The more significant and substantial issue presented to the 
Court involved the argument that several sections of the 
SMCRA violated tenth amendment limits on congressional 
power;n This argument gave the Court an opportunity to reex-
amine its holding in National League of Cities v. Usery,48 at a 
time when the banner of states' rights is attracting great follow-
ings, particularly in the West. National League of Cities in-
volved a challenge to amendments to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act49 requiring state and local governments to observe minimum 
wage and maximum hour regulations. The Court there con-
cluded that the tenth amendment bars exercise of the commerce 
clause authority in ways impairing "States' 'ability to function 
effectively in a federal system'."110 
In Virginia, the Court stood by the approach of National 
League of Cities, enunciating a three-part test for approaching 
tenth amendment challenges to the exercise of federal power. In-
validation of congressional regulation on tenth amendment 
grounds would require, at a minimum, (1) "a showing that the 
challenged statute regulates the 'States as States'," (2) a show-
ing that the federal regulation addresses "matters which are 
clearly 'attributes of state sovereignty'," and (3) a finding "that 
the States' compliance with the federal law would directly im-
pair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of 
traditional governmental functions'."111 Under this approach, the 
Court correctly rejected the tenth amendment challenges to pro-
visions of the SMCRA, because the legislation did not regulate 
the "States as States" as required by the first element of the 
test.112 
gressional regulation of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 303 (1964). Furthermore, the activities under regulation have such apparent effects 
upon interstate commerce that no great significance should be attached to the absence of 
the "substantial effect" terminology. If the case involved more isolated or localized activ-
ity, perhaps the Court's particular language would have import, but strip mining argua-
bly has a far greater impact upon interstate commerce than operating a motel or restau-
rant, both of which have been held to be subject to congressional power over interstate 
commerce. See id.; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
47. Virginia involved a challenge to a provision requiring surface mining operators on 
steep slopes to return the land to its "approximate original contour," 30 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(d) (Supp. III 1979). 101 S. Ct. at 2364. In Indiana, the general "approximate 
original contour" requirement, 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979), and the various 
"prime farmland" provisions were challenged. 101 S. Ct. at 2380, 2381 & n.6, 2385-86. 
48. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
50. 426 U.S. at 852 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1974)). 
51. 101 S. Ct. at 2366 (quoting 426 U.S. at 845, 852, 854). 
52. But see Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, Inc. v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 
431-35 (W.D. Va. 1980) (arguing that the SMCRA contravenes the tenth amendment 
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The Court's ruling on the tenth amendment question seems 
inescapably correct. Strictly speaking, the SMCRA addresses the 
activities of private coal _operators, and thus does not regulate 
the "States as States." The Act does not require state legislation 
or regulation, or the expenditure of state funds. 113 To invalidate 
federal legislation which does not impose specific requirements 
on the "States as States" would greatly weaken legitimate con-
gressional authority over vital aspects of commerce. The 
SMCRA represents an exercise in "cooperative federalism,"114 
not unlike other environmental legislation. 1111 Private citizens, not 
governmental entities, are those directly regulated - and "noth-
ing in National League of Cities suggests that the Tenth 
Amendment shields the States from pre-emptive federal regula-
tion of private activities affecting interstate commerce."116 
There is, however, one troubling aspect of the Court's resolu-
tion of the tenth amendment issue. The majority opinion seems 
to have adopted the view, first expressed in Justice Blackmun's 
concurrence in National League of Cities, that the federal gov-
ernment might have greater leeway to operate in areas tradition-
ally reserved to the states where a "demonstrably greater" fed-
eral interest, such as environmental protection, is at stake. 117 In 
Virginia, the Court made specific reference to Blackmun's con-
currence to support the proposition that a tenth amendment 
challenge to congressional action would not necessarily be suc-
cessful even if all elements of the three-part test were satisfied, 
observing that "the nature of the federal interest advanced may 
be such that it justifies State submission. "118 The difficulty with 
this approach, though, is its lack of a constitutional foundation. 
The Constitution does not grant Congress expanded powers to 
intrude upon state sovereignty regarding specific subject matters 
such as health or environmental regulation. While the underly-
ing policies may have appeal to some environmentalists, the 
because it interferes with the state's plan for economic development, undermines the 
state's economy, forces the state to spend money in compliance with the federal scheme, 
and deprives the state of the ability to choose how best to protect the environment), 
reu'd sub nom; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2352 
(1981); Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452, 461-68 (S.D. Ind. 1980) (upholding chal-
lenges to the SMCRA under the tenth amendment because land use control and plan-
ning decisions constitute areas of traditional state sovereignty that are displaced by the 
legislation), reu'd sub nom. Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981). 
53. 101 S. Ct. at 2366. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. n.30. 
56. Id. at 2367. 
57. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
58. 101 S. Ct. at 2366 n.29. · 
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ramifications for the federalist system are severe indeed. The 
approach endorsed in Virginia might enable Congress, under the 
guise of environmental concerns, to enact elaborate regulatory 
schemes usurping traditional state functions. The Court should 
move to eliminate this possibility at its earliest convenience. 
The Virginia and Indiana decisions should not be viewed as a 
setback for Westerners. The SMCRA, in fact, has been generally 
accepted in the West. Much of the feuding and interference with 
state governmental operations has stemmed, and will continue 
to stem, from the manner in which the Office of Surface Mining 
has administered the SMC RA. 69 The Interior Department re-
cently has moved to address this problem by reorganizing the 
Office of Surface Mining so as to deemphasize the federal gov-
ernment's role under the SMCRA.60 Although these actions are 
controversial and may be challenged through litigation, in the 
West this deemphasis may prove ultimately beneficial both to 
surface mining and the environment. Congress clearly intended 
that the Office of Surface Mining would merely oversee the 
states' conduct under the SMCRA;61 returning the Office of Sur-
face Mining to its intended role would likely improve the effi-
ciency of Western surface mining programs. The Western States 
generally have formulated good, workable programs under the 
SMCRA,62 and they have no intention of allowing devastation of 
their lands should the federal government adopt a less intrusive 
stance in the regulation of surface mining.63 
59. Governor Herschler of Wyoming, for instance, argues that the Office of Surface 
Mining has frustrated the congressional desire for a partnership between the states and 
federal government in the administration of surface mining programs: "They give us ex-
cuses, justifications, offer to work hand in hand, reassurance that we are to receive pri-
macy - but they deny us the things that count." Oversight - The Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Energy 
and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Surface Min-
ing Oversight Hearings). 
60. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text infra. 
61. See H.R. REP. No. 218, supra note 25, at 57, 129. 
62. Several Western State regulatory programs have been approved. See 45 Fed. Reg. 
82,211 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 906) (Colorado); 30 C.F.R. § 926 (1980) 
(Montana); 45 Fed. Reg. 86,489 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 931) (New Mexico); 
45 Fed. Reg. 82,246 (1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 934) (North Dakota); 46 Fed. 
Reg. 5,913 (1981) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 944) (Utah); 45 Fed. Reg. 78,684, 84,765 
(1980) (to be codified in 30 C.F.R. § 950) (Wyoming). 
63. See Surface Mining Oversight Hearings, supra note 59, at 26-27 (remarks of 
Wyoming Governor Herschler). 
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B. Permanent Program Regulations Under the SMCRA 
Implementation of the SMCRA requires issuance of regula-
tions by the Office of Surface Mining.64 Congress devised a two-
step process for implementation of the legislation while in-
tending that the states would assume primary administrative 
and enforcement responsibilities under the Act.611 The SMCRA 
contemplated an interim regulatory period, wherein permits 
would be issued by the state on the basis of provisional regula-
tions formulated by the Office of Surface Mining.68 Ultimately, 
the Office of Surface Mining would promulgate regulations per-
manently implementing the SMCRA, providing far more specific 
and detailed design criteria and performance standards than 
contained in the legislation itself. 67 
The attention of mine operators, government officials, and 
public interest groups must focus on the structure of regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior for permanent 
mining programs, and on the state programs devised to comply 
with those regulations. This regulatory package, by controlling 
daily mining operations and the scope of government oversight, 
will dictate where the power over strip-mining operations will lie 
- with the states · or with the federal government. Given the 
surge in Western strip mining, the regulations will be instrumen-
tal in determining whether coal policy indeed aligns "the West 
against the rest. "68 
64. 30 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. III 1979). The statutory lahguage refers to the Secretary, 
but, in practice, the regulations have been formulated by the Office of Surface Mining. 
65. See id. §§ 1251-1254. 
66. See 30 C.F.R. § 710 (1980). 
67. See id. §§ 700-890. 
68. The status of the permanent program regulations, however, is uncertain. The pro-
gram implementing the SMCRA faces a cloudy future after its stormy beginnings. Con-
gress originally intended that the states would submit their programs to the Secretary of 
the Interior for approval by February 3, 1979. 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (Supp. III 1979). Be-
cause of delays, though, the Secretary's regulations themselves were not promulgated 
until March 13, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902 (1979), and the states were given until March 
3, 1980, to submit their programs, 30 C.F.R. § 731.12 (1980). At this writing, all but three 
states - Alaska, Georgia, and Washington - affected by the SMCRA have submitted 
programs. 
Even in states with submitted programs, substantial uncertainty remains. Numerous 
state courts have enjoined operation of the state programs pending resolution of the vari-
ous challenges to regulations issued by the Secretary. See, e.g., Alabama Surface Mining 
Reel. Council v. Alabama SMRC, No. CV 80-369 (Walker County Ala. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 
1980); Illinois Coal Ass'n v. Illinois Dep't of Mines & Minerals, No. 80-CH-303 (Ill. 7th 
Cir. Ct. Dec. 11, 1980); Meadowlark Farms v. Indiana Dep't of Natural Resources, No. 
C80-1952 (Marion Ind. Cir. Ct. July 29, 1980); Morris & Marshall, Inc. v. Kentucky, No. 
90-C.1.-238 (Martin Ky. Cir. Ct. Oct. 31, 1980); Maryland Coal Ass'n v. Department of 
88 Journal of Law Reform [VoL.15:1 
The Secretary of the Interior's power to issue regulations ex-
tending beyond the existing contours of the SMCRA has not 
gone unquestioned. The Peabody Coal Company recently chal-
lenged the Secretary's authority to issue regulations requiring 
mining-permit applicants to submit information beyond that re-
quired by the SMCRA itself.69 Peabody contended that- given 
the explicit, meticulous requirements set forth in the SMCRA 
regarding permit applications and reclamation plans70 - the Act 
barred the Secretary from going beyond its provisions when for-
mulating rules. In response, the Secretary urged that his statuto-
rily mandated oversight role would have no meaning without the 
authority "to seek more information in the permit application 
than explicitly required by statute."71 
The court acknowledged the validity of Peabody's position, 
based upon the concept of state primacy, that the SMCRA did 
not empower the federal government to intrude unduly into 
state strip mining programs.72 Nonetheless, the court found stat-
utory authority, consistent with state primacy, enabling the Sec• 
retary of the Interior to issue rules extending federal involve-
ment in state-administered mining operations beyond the 
specific dictates of the SMCRA. Under section 201(c)(2) of the 
legislation, the Secretary has authority to "publish and promul-
gate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out 
the purposes and provisions of [the Act]."73 Such a general grant 
of authority, similar to provisions of the Clean Air Act7" and the 
Clean Water Act,76 has been construed broadly by the courts.78 
Natural Resources, No. 35343 (Allegany County Md. Cir. Ct. May 1, 1981); Ohio Coal & 
Energy Ass'n v. Ohio, No. 80CV-11-6152 (Franklin County Ohio Ct. C.P. Nov. 24, 1980); 
Consolidation Coal v. Ohio, No. A-CIV-266 (Belmont County Ohio Ct. C.P. Nov. 1980); 
Pennsylvania Coal Mining Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, Nos. 21718, 21719 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
Nov. 26, 1980, Dec. 24, 1980, Feb. 13, 1981); Virginia Surface Mining & Reel Ass'n v. 
Virginia DCED, No. 4863 (Va. Ch. Dec. 3, 1980); Alleghany Mining Corp. v. Callaghan, 
No. 81-579 (Kanawha County W. Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 1981). 
69. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-1863). 
70. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1257-1258 (Supp. III 1979). 
71. 653 F.2d at 519. 
72. Id. at 519-20. Under a properly functioning state program, the state, not the fed-
eral government, issues permits; thus the state controls which interests may mine a par-
cel, and the duration and operating conditions of that mining. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 
1260 (Supp. III 1979). The state passes on the suitability of reclamation efforts, see id. 
§ 1260(b), inspects the mining operations, see id. §§ 1259, 1267, and imposes sanctions 
for violations of permit conditions, see id. § 1268(i). But see id. § 1271(b) (empowering 
the Secretary of the Interior to take over a state mining program when the state fails to 
adequately administer and enforce the program). 
73. 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(2) (Supp. III 1979). 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(l) (Supp. III 1979). 
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
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In keeping with this approach, the court rejected Peabody's 
argument - based upon the presence within the SMCRA of 
twenty-one specific grants of rulemaking power - that this sec-
tion merely summarizes the Secretary's powers under the legisla-
tion and cannot provide an independent justification for federal 
regulatory action. 77 
Furthermore, the court found implied authority to issue the 
challenged regulations in section 501(b) of the SMCRA, which 
requires the Secretary to promulgate permanent regulations gov-
erning surface coal mining and reclamation operations.78 While 
Peabody Coal contended that section 501(b) simply enables the 
Secretary to issue "mechanical" provisions regarding formal as-
pects of the permit process, 79 the court accepted the Secretary's 
opinion that the informational provisions of the SMCRA require 
supplementation through section 501(b) to ensure effective im-
plementation of the Act. 80 
Aside from the specific question regarding the proper inter-
pretation of the rulemaking sections of the SMCRA, Peabody 
advanced a more general argument based upon the overall struc-
ture of the Act. Peabody contended that the state, as opposed to 
the federal, government must have the power to specify informa-
tion required of mining-permit applicants, because the SMCRA 
grants the state exclusive authority to make permit-issuing deci-
sions. 81 The court, in rejecting this" 'common sense' rule of reg-
ulatory authority,"82 noted that although individual state permit 
decisions were not subject to federal review, overall state per-
formance under the SMCRA would be reviewed; the Secretary 
thus could require information to enable vigilant federal atten-
tion to state performance under the SMCRA.83 
The decision is flawed in several respects. First, the court 
acted inappropriately in placing heavy reliance upon the Secre-
tary's assessment "that the explicit information provisions in-
cluded in the Act should be supplemented to guarantee its eff ec-
tive implementation."8' While the court argued that 
"[d]eference to the administering agency is particularly appro-
priate" when questions arise involving a hard-fought statute 
76. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). 
77. 653 F.2d at 523-24. 
78. 30 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. III 1979). 
79. 653 F.2d at 524. , 
80. Id. at 522-24. 
81. Id. at 525-26. 
82. Id. at 525. 
83. Id. at 526. 
84. Id. at 522. 
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such as the SMCRA,811 in fact deference to the Secretary's as-
sessment seems peculiarly inappropriate when the federal 
agency is asked to strike the proper balance between state and 
federal interests.86 Deference to a federal agency appears incon-
sistent with the statutory scheme of entrusting "primary govern-
ment responsibility" to the states under the Act. 87 Second, the 
court evinced a distrust of state implementation of the legisla-
tion, thus giving too little weight to the overall statutory scheme. 
The court began its analysis of the Secretary's power to issue 
supplementary regulations by observing "that Congress was not 
interested in perpetuating the existing tradition of state mining 
regulation," concluding that "Congress did not withhold powers 
that the Secretary might require in his efforts to safeguard fed-
eral interests."88 This conclusion, however, does not nec:essarily 
flow from the observed congressional discontent with prior state 
practices. Congress' response to the states' failure to police strip 
mining practices adequately, ironic though it may be, was to de-
vise legislation placing primary respcmsibility with those self-
same states. Congress intended the states to be responsible -
under a carefully orchestrated set of provisions contained within 
the SMCRA - to carry out its will. The court's notion that the 
Secretary should be allowed "to tell the states that they need 
more information to meet their responsibilities"89 disregards the 
goal implicit in the statutory structure that the states should op-
erate with a minimum level of federal interference. 80 
The SMCRA itself sets forth minimum requirements for in-
formation gathering, permit procedures, and the general opera-
tions of a state program.91 The states should be entrusted with 
broad discretion, provided these statutory minima are satisfied.es 
The regulations promulgated by the Secretary, however, layered 
onto the already detailed standards provided in the SMCRA, ef-
fectively negate the possibilities for state discretion. While the 
Secretary contended that the states retained adequate discretion 
through the "state window" provision enabling adoption of al-
ternatives "consistent with the regulations" issued by the Secre-
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 533 & n.11 (Tamm, J., dissenting). 
87. 30 U.S.C. § i201(O (Supp. III 1979); see 653 F.2d at 531 (Tamm, J., dissenting) 
("look broadly at the Act's purposes and structure to decide which approach is more 
faithful to Congress's overall design"). 
88. 653 F.2d at 521. 
89. Id. at 526. 
90. See note 65 supra. 
91. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253(a), 1256, 1257(b) (Supp. III 1979). 
92. See 653 F.2d at 531-34 (Tamm, J., dissenting). 
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tary,93 Judge Tamm's dissent aptly described this window as a 
"one-way mirror."" Under the "state window" guidelines, a 
state-proposed alternative to the Secretary's regulations will be 
found "consistent with" those regulations only when "the state 
laws and regulations are no less stringent than and meet the ap-
plicable provisions of this Act,"91~ thus leaving little leeway in 
fact to the States. 98 
The Secretary of the Interior should not be allowed to intrude 
upon the discretion entrusted to the states by the SMCRA. The 
congressional deliberations, with their emphasis upon state pri-
macy in the regulation of surface mining, 97 acknowledged the 
wisdom of providing the states maximum flexibility to tailor 
mining programs.98 As Judge Tamm noted in dissent, however, 
honoring the flexibility contained wit~in the SMCRA would not 
strip the Secretary of power under the Act. The Secretary can 
issue interpretative rulings regarding the informational provi-
sions of the SMCRA, and he has the authority to recommend 
requirements more stringent than those found in the Act. More-
over, the Secretary retains power under the SMCRA to assume 
administration and enforcement of the Act if a state is found to 
be derelict in its responsibilities.99 Limiting the scope of the Sec-
retary's authority to the provisions of the SMCRA thus strikes 
93. 30 C.F.R. § 731.13(c)(l) (1980). 
94. 653 F.2d at 532 n.9 (Tamm, J., dissenting). 
95. 30 C.F.R. § 730.5(b) (1980). 
96. See 653 F.2d at 532 n.9 (Tamm, J., dissenting). See also Surface Mining Over-
sight Hearings, supra note 59, at 5 (remarks of Sen. Randolph): 
The Congress designed the Surface Mining law to insure equitable and uniform 
regulation of the industry through use of the 'state window' concept. Flexibility 
was built into the statute to provide latitude in implementing the legislation. 
Unfortunately, I believe our flexibility was interpreted by the Office of Surface 
Mining as an absence of position. 
Wyoming Governor Herschler agreed: 
As a practical matter . . • the window is closed. The regulations require exces-
sive proof that a departure from the Federal regulations is warranted. Many 
state officials believe that the required showing would be as expensive as a law-
suit. The result is particularly frustrating •.. [because) the federal regulations 
go beyond the standards of the act to require specific procedures and techniques. 
It follows that the States will be required to use procedures that clearly do not 
fit nationwide. This is not what the Congress intended . • • • 
Id. at 8. 
97. See H.R. REP. No. 218, supra note 25, at 57, 129. 
98. The states face individual problems that cannot be addressed adequately by a 
uniform set of federal regulations. For instance, Western States receive considerably less 
rainfall than coal-producing states in the East. Performance and reclamation standards 
must take such climactic differences into account. Furthermore, different terrain in the 
various coal-producing states requires diversification in mining techniques, reclamation 
efforts, and environmental protection. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (Supp. ill 1979). 
99. See 653 F.2d at 534 (Tamm, J., dissenting). 
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the appropriate balance between the extremes of oppressive fed-
eral control and the haphazard state systems that arguably ex-
isted prior to passage of the Act.100 
The present administration is taking steps to achieve the 
proper mix of authority under the SMCRA. Recent proposals by 
the Secretary of the Interior would drastically reshape the sur-
face mining program. The Office of Surface Mining has been 
pared back, through the elimination of five regional offices and 
some 400 jobs,101 in order to vest more power in the states. Fur-
thermore, the Secretary has promulgated regulations that alter 
the "state window" concept,102 so that states adopting alterna-
tives to federal requirements "no longer are required to demon-
strate that each alternative is necessary because of local require-
ments or local environmental or agricultural conditions. "108 As 
the administration recognizes, the future of Western coal pro-
duction depends heavily upon striking a balance of authority 
whereby every state will decide for itself "what is best for that 
state, provided certain minimum federal requirements are 
met."104 
II. SEVERANCE TAXES 
The controversy over the proper scope of federal involvement 
in state surface mining programs represents only one facet of the 
tension between the West and the federal government regarding 
coal policy. Another controversy, recently considered in the Su-
preme Court, centers upon the powers of the States to levy sev-
erance taxes on minerals. 
During most of this century, states endowed with mineral re-
sources - such as oil, gas, iron ore, and coal - have imposed 
100. The 96th Congress considered enactment of a bill that would have solidified the 
balance between state and federal interests. The bill, S. 1403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979) (referred to as the Rockefeller Amendment), would have deleted the language of 
SMCRA § 503(a)(7), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(7) (Supp. III 1979), requiring state laws and 
regulations to conform to the Secretary's regulations as well as the provisions of the 
SMCRA. Although the bill died in committee in the House in both 1979 and 1980, it 
would have guaranteed the states the flexibility necessary to structure individually their 
programs to promote the goals and purposes of the SMCRA. 
101. See [1981] 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 151. 
102. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,376 (1981) (amending 30 C.F.R. §§ 730.5(b), 731.1, 731.13, 
732.15(a)). 
103. Id. at 53,377. 
104. Letter from Warren White, Chairman, Coal Committee, Western Interstate 
Energy Board, to U.S. Interior Secretary James G. Watt (June 17, 1981) [on file with the 
Journal of Law Reform]. 
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taxes upon the severance of those resources.105 Montana long has 
been among those states charging a severance tax on coal. Until 
1975 this tax was reasonably minimal, varying from twelve to 
fourteen cents per ton according to heat content of the coal.106 
In 1975, however, Montana amended its severance tax schedules 
dramatically, essentially raising the tax rate to thirty percent of 
the extracted-coal price.107 Subsequent to this tax hike, the state 
enacted a constitutional amendment requiring that half of all 
severance-tax revenues be placed in a special trust fund not sub-
ject to appropriation without approval of three-fourths of the 
state legislature. 106 
The increased severance tax resulted from Montana's legiti-
mate desire to avoid being left holding the environmental, eco-
nomic, and social "bag" after exhaustion of the state's coal 
reserves. Montana had experienced a dramatic rise in demand 
for its coal over the past decade: coal produced through surface 
mining within the state had risen from seven to thirty-three mil-
lion tons between 1971 and 1979.109 The increased demand 
105. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Severance Tax Hearings, supra note 15, at 215-
16 (statement of Rep. Williams). 
106. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847, 849 (Mont. 1980), 
aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981). 
107. MoNT. ConE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1979). The section reads as follows: 
(1) A severance tax is imposed on each ton of coal produced in the state in 
accordance with the following schedule: 
Heating Quality 





"Value" means the contract sales price. 
Surface 
Mining 
12 cents or 
20% of value 
22 cents or 
30% of value 
34 cents or 
30% of value 
40 cents or 
30% of value 
Underground 
Mining 
5 cents or 
3% of value 
8 cents or 
4% of value 
10 cents or 
4% of value 
12 cents or 
4% of value 
(2) The formula which yields the greater amount of tax in a particular case 
shall be used at each point on this schedule. 
(3) A person is not liable for any severance tax upon 20,000 tons of the coal he 
produces in a calendar year. 
108. MoNT. CoNsT., art. IX, § 5. 
109. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847, 850 (Mont. 1980), aff'd, 
101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981). 
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stemmed in large part from provisions of the Clean Air Act 
favoring low-sulphur coal such as that found in Montana. 110 Be-
cause this coal is recovered in Montana primarily through sur-
face mining, the substantial deleterious environmental effects re-
sulting from a surge in demand are apparent. Indeed, Montana 
already has suffered the effects of intensive mineral develop-
ment. Copper mining near Butte resulted in a disgraceful mess, 
partly due to inadequate taxation of the activity.111 The state 
legislature was determined to avoid a similar experience with 
surface mining. 
The national interest in the increased state tax, however, was 
substantial. Montana possesses approximately one-quarter of 
the nation's coal reserves112 - enough to supply the entire coun-
try with coal for the next fifty years. 113 Some studies predict 
that Montana, along with Wyoming, will be supplying one-third 
of the nation's coal needs by 1990, a threefold increase from 
1977 .114 Due to the importance of Montana coal, reaction to the 
severance tax from producers and electric utilities across the 
country was predictably hostile. Several coal companies and 
electric power companies brought suit, seeking a· declaratory 
judgment that the tax unconstitutionally burdened interstate 
commerce and frustrated federal energy policies. 
The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the Montana 
state courts finding the severance tax constitutional.1111 In order 
to assess whether the tax violated the commerce clause as an 
110. The Clean Air Act of 1970 was drafted in such a way, with regard to new sources 
of pollution, that use of low-sulphur coal became an inexpensive way of complying with 
standards set by EPA. These standards ostensibly required the best available control 
technology, but were only set as a numerical standard, i.e., amount of sulphur dioxide 
emissions allowable. Most utilities discovered it was cheaper to meet these requirements 
by using low-sulphur Western coal than by installing scrubbers. The 1977 Amendments, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7428 (Supp. m 1979), require the best available technology and a 
reduction of emissions. This now requires scrubbers regardless of whether the coal used 
is low- or high-sulphur. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 187-88, reprinted in 
[1977) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1265-67; Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New 
Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466 (1980). See also Sierra Club v. 
Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding latest new-source performance 
standards). 
111. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 615 P.2d 847, 850 (Mont. 1980), 
atf'd, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981). See generally A. GUTFIELD, MONTANA'S AGONY (1979). 
112. See ENERGY FACTBOOK, supra note 14, at 582. Seventy-five percent of these 
reserves are federally owned but subject to the tax nonetheless. Severance Tax Hearings, 
supra note 15, at 30 (statement of Phil Gramm). · 
113. Severance Tax Hearings, supra note 15, at 22 (statement of Bruce F. Vento). 
114. Id. 
115. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981), atf'g 615 P.2d 
847 (Mont. 1980). 
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undue burden on interstate commerce, 116 the court applied a 
four-part test first formulated in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady. m Under this test, a state tax does not violate the com-
merce clause if (1) it is applied to an activity having a substan-
tial nexus with the taxing state, (2) it is fairly apportioned, (3) it 
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and ( 4) it is 
fairly related to services provided by the state.116 
As the first two prongs of. the Complete Auto Transit test 
were not disputed, 119 the majority focused its inquiry on the 
test's third and fourth elements. Appellants contended that the 
severance tax discriminated against interstate commerce because 
ninety perc.ent of Montana coal is shipped out-of-state, thus un-
duly burdening non-Montana consumers. The Court properly 
found no discrimination against interstate commerce merely be-
cause out-of-state coal consumers were paying more severance 
taxes. The tax rate did not vary according to the final destina-
tion of the coal, 120 so that in fact "the tax burden is borne ac-
cording to the amount of coal consumed and not according to 
, any distinction between in-state and out-of-state consumers."121 
Appellants argued further that Montana's severance tax bore 
n0 fair relation to the services provided by the State, in violation 
of the fourth element of the Complete Auto Transit test. The 
Court, noting that appellants had "completely misunderstood 
the nature of the inquiry under the fourth prong,"122 rejected 
the premise that the Complete Auto Transit test required a re~ 
lationship between tax revenues and costs incurred from a par-
ticular activity.128 Rather, the fourth prong of Complete Auto 
Transit requires that the general revenue tax in questionm be 
116. As a threshold matter, the Court held that commerce clause constraints were 
applicable to the state severance tax. 101 S. Ct. at 2952-53. The Montana Supreme 
Court, drawing upon the authority of Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 
(1922), had found the severance tax immune from commerce clause scrutiny because the 
taxable event, severance of coal by mining, preceded entry of the coal into interstate 
commerce. 615 P.2d at 854. The Supreme Court disapproved the suggestion of Heisler 
and its progeny that commerce clause constraints would not apply to taxes imposed.on 
goods before their entry into interstate commerce, noting that taxes prior to "entry" into 
commerce could nonetheless substantially affect interstate commerce. 101 S. Ct. at 2953. 
117. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
118. Id. at 277-78. 
119. 101 S. Ct. at 2954. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 2956. 
123. Id. at 2958. Indeed, "interstate commerce may be required to contribute to the 
cost of providing all governmental services, including those services from which it argua-
bly receives no direct 'benefit'." Id. at 2959 n.16. 
124. The Court found no reason to question the Montana Supreme Court's character-
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"assessed in proportion to a taxpayer's activities or presence in a 
State."1211 The Montana tax satisfied this requirement because 
tax liability, measured as a percentage of the coal taken, in-
creased in direct relation to appellants' activities within Mon-
tana.126 Given this relationship between the measure of the tax 
and the extent of contacts with the state, the Court was willing 
to defer to the legislative resolution127 of the appropriate level or 
rate of taxation.128 
Appellants also challenged the Montana severance tax on 
supremacy clause grounds, contending that the tax conflicted 
with the amended version of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 
1920129 and federal statutes meant to encourage coal produc-
tion.1so In fact, however, language within the Mineral Leasing 
Act specifically authorizes states to impose severance taxes upon 
lessees of federal mines.1s1 Furthermore, the Court - while ac-
knowledging the general federal policy, reflected by numerous 
statutes, in encouraging coal production - found no specific 
congressional intent to preempt state severance taxes.1s2 
The Court's approach to the Montana tax, endorsing propor-
ization of the severance tax as a general revenue tax.Id. at 2956. 
125. Id. at 2959. 
126. Id. at 2958-59. 
127. The Court noted that Congress could intercede should a particular state tax be 
found contrary to federal interests. Id. at 2959. 
128. The Court was correct in its assessment that the rate and circumstances of a 
severance tax should be policy decisions left to the legislature. The social, political, and 
economic factors underlying severance taxes are quite complex and vary from state to 
state. Thus, the Court properly did not attempt to identify a point at which a state tax 
would constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce. 
In regard specifically to the Montana tax, the real impact upon interstate commerce is 
less than might appear at first glance, because the tax is levied upon the coal's value at 
the time of severance. A 30% tax assessed upon severance gives little indication of the 
impact the tax will have upon the final sale price of coal at its out-of-state destination. 
For example, the Montana Supreme Court noted that the sale price f.o.b. mine for Mon-
tana coal destined for Texas is $7 per ton, creating a tax liability of $2.10 per ton. The 
same coal, however, is priced at $30 per ton in Texas - so that the severance tax repre-
sents only 7% of the total cost of Montana c·oal to a Texas utility. See Commonwealth 
Edison Co. v. Montana, 625 P.2d 847, 856 (1980), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981). 
129. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (Supp. Ill 1979). 
130. Specifically, appellants argued that the tax would frustrate and impair the na-
tional energy policies reflected in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, § 2(6), 
42 U.S.C. § 6201(6) (Supp. III 1979), and the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 
1978, § 830l(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § E3301(b)(3) (Supp. Ill 1979). 
131. The Court discovered "nothing in language or legislative history of either the 
1920 Act or the 1975 Amendments to support appellants' assertion that Congress in-
tended to maximize and capture all 'economic rents' from the mining of federal coal." 
101 S. Ct. at 2961. The Montana tax did not abridge the congressional intent to obtain a 
"fair return to the public" from the mining of federal lands. Id. 
132. Id. at 2960-64. 
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tional tax schemes while placing flat rates under closer scrutiny, 
heads in the proper direction. The decision gives lower courts a 
starting point for assessing the validity of severance taxes, while 
avoiding the difficulties of detailed factual inquiries into actual 
effects upon interstate commerce. Although the decision opens 
the door for percentage severance tax rates exceeding those 
imposed in Montana, 133 the Court made clear the congressional 
power to intercede when a tax interferes with federal 
interests.134 
The decision will have significant impact beyond Montana. 
Wyoming, for example, exacts severance and ad valorem taxes at 
an effective combined rate of approximately seventeen and one-
half percent.135 While other Western States levy substantially 
lower severance taxes on coal, the sentiments that motivated the 
Montana legislature might influence other states as well. Indeed, 
most Western States are similar to Montana: they are sparsely 
populated and have insubstantial in-state coal needs relative ·to 
their production capacity. Severance taxes represent a means of 
financing responses to the impact arising from intensive coal 
mining operations which satisfy the needs of electric utilities 
and industries located elsewhere. These taxes are not imposed 
by the Western States in order to reap "windfall profits" from 
the increasing demand for coal. Rather, vast amounts of money 
are necessary to ameliorate the adverse impacts of increased 
production, 138 to provide additional government services and 
planning efforts as support for mining operations, and to expand 
133. In dissent, Justice Blackmun ar~ed that the majority's reasoning would permit 
a tax rate of 100 or even 1,000 percent of ~alue. 101 S. Ct. at 2968 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). Moreover, he asserted that ;'the Court's analysis indicates that Montana's severance 
tax would not run afoul of the· Commerce Clause even if it raised sufficient revenue to 
allow Montana to eliminate all other taxes upon its citizens." Id. 
134. Id. at 2959. See note 127 and accompanying text supra. 
135. WYOMING STAT. §§ 39-6-302, 303 (1977 & Supp. 1981). 
136. An example of the impact upon communities involved in energy development 
can be gleaned from testimony of Congressman Cheny of Wyoming during consideration 
of legislation to establish a ceiling on severance taxes. Although the resource involved is 
not coal, the example is instructive of community needs similar to those anticipated in 
coal regions: 
If we look at the city of Evanston in the southwest corner of the State [Wyo-
ming), a small community of 7,500 now; it faces an average annual growth rate of 
29 percent because of the oil boom in the overthrust belt. This one community 
needs 800 new single-family homes or apartments within the next year; they 
need 1,800 trailer court lots now; they need new sewer system improvements 
immediately; they need additional well and water storage facilities, a new police 
building, a new jail, additional police officers, a brand new hospital, new doctors, 
a 15-percent cost-of-living increase for the employees of the town. 
Severance Tax Hearings, supra note 15, at 173. 
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the States' economic bases beyond a dependency upon energy 
developers. 
The Western States recognize the need to develop their re-
sources' for the sake of the nation's energy future, and do not 
relish being pitted in a struggle of the "West against the rest."187 
Thus, understandable consternation arises in these States when 
they are not trusted with development of resources within their 
boundaries. 
Such distrust was manifested in legislation introduced in the 
96th Congress which would have placed a ceiling of twelve and 
one-half percent on severance taxes.188 Diverse advocates of the 
legislation contended that. such a limitation was necessary to 
prevent Montana and other coal-producing states from taking 
unfair advantage of their abundant coal reserves.139 Although 
congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce likely 
. would extend to a limitation on severance taxes, 140 this approach 
should be avoided as a matter of policy. Professor Tribe asserts 
that "Congress cannot deny the states some revenue with which 
to operate, some sphere of autonomous lawmaking competence, 
and some measure of choice in selecting a political structure."141 
Legislatio~ which contemplates absolute limits on severance 
taxes, by preventing unique solutions to the particular problems 
arising from coal development, effectively denies states the nec-
essary measure of autonomy described by Tribe.142 The states' 
137. See generally Surface Mining Oversight Hearings, supra note 59; Severance 
Tax Hearings, supra note 15. New Mexico's policy, for instance, intends 
to assure that taxation of energy resources provide[s] a fair share of tax revenues 
to the State and that these revenues are sufficient to provide for the costs im-
posed by energy development and include compensation to present and future 
generations for the depletion of energy resources without jeopardizing future en-
ergy development. In addition, with respect to coal •.• , tax revenues from [its] 
extraction should be maximi2ed with due consideration given to the continued 
profitability of existing operations and the maintenance of an attractive invest-
ment climate for future operations. 
N.M. ENERGY AND MINERALS DEP'T, NEw MExtco STATE ENERGY PLAN 43 (1978). 
138. See S. 2695, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6625, H.R. 6654, & H.R. 7163, 
96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980). Similar bills have been introduced in the 97th Congress. See 
S. 178, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1981). 
139. See generally Severance Tax Hearings, supra note 15; Note, The Increasing 
Conflict Between State Coal Severance Taxation and Federal Energy Policy, 57 TEx. L. 
REV. 675 (1979). The Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition warned that high sev-
erance taxes may create "a kind of United American Emirates" of energy-rich states 
seeking to beggar their energy-poor neighbors. Hagstrom, The Severance Tax Is the Big 
Gun In the Energy War Between the States, 13 NAT'L J. 1544, 1544 (1981). 
140. See 101 S. Ct. at 2959; note 126 and accompanying text supra. 
141. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 302 (1978). 
142. Remarks by Congressman Cheny of Wyoming illustrate the quandary facing the 
Western States: 
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rights and regionalism issues arising from intensive energy de-
velopment in the West may indicate serious problems for the 
region and the nation. "Regardless of what happens [to the sev-
erance tax legislation], the coal severance tax issue will continue 
as a catalyst for a broadening debate over fiscal disparities be-
tween the energy-rich and energy-poor states."143 A limitation 
on severance tax rates only compounds and unnecessarily com-
plicates these matters. 
CONCLUSION 
Reasonable accommodation of competing state and federal in-
terests is critical to satisfactory resolution of the problems and 
possibilities arising from the Surface Mining Act and the issues 
surrounding state severance taxes. While the federal government 
may find restrictive actions attractive to achieve its energy 
objectives, in fact any federal initiatives which place the West 
. further at odds with the rest of the nation can only exacerbate 
the country's energy ills. Further division between the Western 
States and the federal government regarding development of 
mineral resources makes the possibility of a comprehensive na-
tional energy plan increasingly less feasible. 
This bleak picture, though, need not be the outcome of resolv-
ing the conflicts presented here. A brightened energy future can 
be consistent with a healthy social, environmental, and economic 
climate in the West - provided the federal government pursues 
a sensitive policy which accommodates the legitimate concerns 
of the Western States regarding the ill-effects of intensive coal 
development. 
We find ourselves in Wyoming in a difficult situation. We are not all that eager 
to have the kind of development that is forecast for our state. We frankly have 
the feeling that we are going to have a massive synthetic fuels industry in north-
eastern Wyoming because the folks in Seabrook or Harrisburg don't like nuclear 
power, or the folks out of New Jersey don't like to drill for oil, or the Congress 
won't open up the national petroleum reserve in Alaska. 
We have moved forward because we feel it is important for the country to 
support this kind of-effort to increase our energy resources here at home. The 
price that has been extracted in terms of the severance ta:r. is modest and only 
goes to meet [identifiable] needs .... 
Severance Tax Hearings, supra note 15, at 191. 
143. Hagstrom, supra note 139, at 1544. 

